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Abstract—Cybercrime continues to cause increasing threat to
Q1
4
business processes, eroding stakeholders’ trust in Internet tech-5
nologies. In this article, we explore how six dominant algorithmic6
trust positions facilitate cognitive processing, which, in turn, can7
influence an organization’s productivity and align its values and8
support structures for combating cybercrimes. This conceptual9
paper uses a cognitive perspective described as a throughput model.10
This modeling perspective captures several dominant algorithmic11
trust positions for organizations, providing a new, and powerful ap-12
proach which seeks to enhance our understanding of the cognitive13
representation of decision-making processes. These trust positions14
are rational-based trust, rule-based trust, category-based trust,15
third-party based trust, role-based trust, and knowledge-based16
trust. Finally, we provide conclusion and implications for future17
research.18
Index Terms—Cybercrime, cognitive processing, decision-19
making model, fraud triangle, throughput model, trust pathways.20
I. INTRODUCTION21
ONE of the major concerns for managers is the threat from22 cybercrime that influences trust systems in organizations23
[1], [2]. Thus, organizations have built artificial intelligence24
systems to use human reasoning as a model to solve fraudulent25
problems [3]. Fraud is an intentional dishonesty that harms a26
person or organization by causing an economic loss and/or the27
individual(s) responsible to realize a gain [4], [5]. Risk refers28
to the possibility of loss, which arises because of uncertainties29
or our inability to foresee the future [5]–[7]. This article uses30
a cognitive decision-modeling approach that allows for the31
examination of individual algorithmic pathway levels. Decision-32
making is the process by which we utilize our perceptions33
and information in order to form judgments to make choices34
to accomplish our goals [8]. Recent research has confirmed35
that people vary in the degree to which they form normative36
judgments and preferences on thinking bias tasks [9]–[11].37
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Fig. 1. Throughput modeling process where P = perception, I = information,
J = judgment, and D = decision choice. Source: Rodgers, 2006.
The work of Tombu and Mandel [23] has demonstrated that 38
the way people perceive cognitive filters, such as decision heuris- 39
tics, can influence information. That is, when confronted with 40
an expected loss and a choice between a sure option and a risky 41
option, the gain–loss framing of the problem has been shown to 42
influence option preference. With regards to the prospect theory, 43
this framing effect is the consequence of contradictory attitudes 44
pertaining to risks involving gains and losses. 45
Building on this seminal work, Culbertson and Rodgers, [12], 46
Rodgers [13], and Foss [14], [15], and Rodgers and Al Fayi [9] 47
found that by implementing a throughput modeling approach, it 48
was possible to represent risky decision making as including per- 49
ception (P), information (I), judgment (J), and decision choice 50
(D). The throughput model assumes that information inputs pass 51
through the cognitive filters of perception and judgment before 52
decision choices are made (see Fig. 1). 53
In addition, this article utilizes propositions to suggest a link 54
between concepts, which suggest promising areas of inquiry 55
for researchers. Further, we use propositions to spur further 56
research on several “trust questions,” especially as it relates 57
to artificial intelligence, in hopes that further evidence or ex- 58
perimental methods will be discovered that will make testable 59
hypotheses. Finally, propositions serve as a common assumption 60
that can support further speculation. This can occur in extremely 61
complex artificial intelligence algorithms, such as those dealt 62
with by sociology and economics of artificial intelligence impact 63
on users, where an experimental test would be prohibitively 64
expensive or difficult [28]. 65
Furthermore, the throughput model advances six distinct al- 66
gorithmic pathways tied to six dominant trust positions [16], 67
[17]. Thus these algorithms are part of an artificial intelligence 68
0018-9391 © 2020 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.





2 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT
Fig. 2. Three key steps in risk management decision choices. Source: Adopted from Rodgers (2006).
model (i.e., throughput model), which allows us to find so-69
lutions to a problem [18]. These trust positions tied to the70
throughput model are rational-based trust (P→D), rule-based71
trust (P→J→D), category-based trust (I→J→D), third-party-72
based trust (I→P→D), (5) role-based trust (P→I→J→D), and73
knowledge-based or historical/dispositional trust (I→P→J→D)74
[4], [9], [19]–[21]. In sum, these algorithms provide a sequence75
of steps implemented to solve a problem. The sequence offers76
a unique way of addressing an issue by delivering a particular77
solution. Based on Fig. 1, we can establish six general pathways78
that can be applied to the six dominate trust positions as follows.79
1) P→D Trust as a rational choice80
2) P→J→D Rule-based trust81
3) I→J→D Category-based trust82
4) I→P→D Third parties as conduits of trust83
5) P→I→J→D Role-based trust84
6) I→P→J→D Knowledge-based trust.85
This article revealed that the resulting model was applica-86
ble across a wide range of general business decision-making87
contexts. Moreover, this line of research was expanded to incor-88
porate risky decision-making activities along with “trust” and89
“ethical” positions [4], [9], [20]. In light of this, this article90
proposes a throughput model that draws from computer science,91
economic, and psychology literatures to model a perceptual92
and judgmental process whereby trust might be implemented93
to reduce fraud and risks [6], [20] (see Fig. 2).94
Prospect theory offers an elegant account of the perception95
framing effect. We add to the literature by asserting that there96
are six dominant algorithmic pathways to a decision choice97
that allows for greater potential in terms of examining how98
risk attitudes are assessed in risky-choice framing problems.99
Some studies questioned the generalisability of the framing100
effect due to predictable eliminations and reversals of the fram-101
ing effect [22], [23]. In other words, findings that cannot be102
accommodated by the explanation that preference reversals (i.e., 103
framing effects) are mediated by concomitant reversals of risk 104
attitudes. 105
This conceptual research paper embeds trust positions in the 106
throughput model based on two types of process errors. The 107
type 1 process error is where decision makers are expected to 108
avoid the risk in a risky decision-making situation or intervene 109
actively in an alternative with the help of a risk-defusing action. 110
The type 2 process error is where the decision maker can select 111
a less risky alternative (passive risk avoidance) [24]. Dual pro- 112
cess theories of cognitive processing distinguish unconscious, 113
emotional, intuitive, and effortless (type I processing) with 114
conscious, controlled and effortful characteristics (type 2) (e.g., 115
[25]; [26]). 116
The type 1 error process represents a rejection of individuals 117
who should be admitted from entering a system (e.g., account- 118
ing/auditing/information system) or network (i.e., type 1 error 119
or false rejection rate). The type 2 process error represents an 120
acceptance of individuals who should not be admitted to a system 121
or network (i.e., type 2 error or false acceptance rate). In this 122
article, we investigate differences between active (type 1) and 123
passive (type 2) risk avoidance in trust situations. More specif- 124
ically, this article aims to identify appropriate trust positions to 125
reduce/increase the type 1 and type 2 process errors, and then 126
discusses the implications of using a particular trust position 127
in relation to people, processes and technology [4], [6], [20], 128
[27]. Sections II and III clarify and highlight the issue of trust 129
and trustworthiness. The discussion explores the relationship 130
between the throughput model and dominant trust positions (see 131
Table I). 132
The aforementioned processes help to tie trust positions to 133
the throughput modeling paradigm, which in turn generates 134
propositions. An initial stage in the scientific process is not 135
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TABLE I
TRUST POSITIONS RELATED TO TYPES 1 AND 2 ERRORS
which may then be tested critically by observations and ex-137
periments. Thus “proposition generation” is a necessary step138
in addressing critical issues surrounding people, processes, and139
technology. Likewise, Popper [28] also makes the vital assertion140
that the goal of the scientist’s efforts is not the verification but141
the falsification of the initial hypothesis. It is understandably142
unattainable to confirm the truth of a general law by repeated143
observations. Nonetheless, at least in principle, it is possible144
to falsify such a law by a single observation. Therefore, the145
propositions assist in identifying and exploring the dominant146
six-trust positions’ relationship with fraudulent transactions and147
risk factors.148
Finally, we conclude with a summary outlining implication149
for research and practice dealing with forensic and fraud orga-150
nizational systems.151
II. DEFINITION OF TRUST152
Most literature on trust fails to distinguish trust from trustwor-153
thiness. Trust is a social psychological factor, which includes the154
reduction of control, willingness to accept vulnerability and risk155
based upon the positive expectations of the actions of the trustee156
[29]. Trustworthiness, on the other hand, involves the ability,157
benevolence and integrity of a trustee [30], [31]. Some scholars 158
view trust as synonymous with trustworthiness and explain trust 159
in the context of personal attributes that impel positive expecta- 160
tions on the part of the trustee [32], [33]. Whilst some scholars 161
view trust as a behavioral intention rather than a psychological 162
factor [30], [33], others view trust as a biological component 163
within the individual, which develops early in life and remains 164
relatively stable through adulthood Webb and Worchel [34] In 165
this regard, Mayer et al. [30] adopted an integrative model to 166
define trust by using the trustworthy variables (benevolence, 167
ability and integrity) as antecedent of trust. Their model attempts 168
to separate the trustworthy variables into two major components, 169
such as ability component and character component. The ability 170
component measures the “can do” aspects, whereas the character 171
component measures the “will do” aspects. Trust decisions affect 172
a company’s relationship with its community, customers, em- 173
ployees, stockholders, and suppliers [35], [36]. Thus, the roles of 174
trust positions in achieving competitive advantage are becoming 175
increasingly popular amongst organizations of all kinds and 176
sizes [9], [19], [37]. 177
The impact of trust on organizational performance and in- 178
crease in productivity has received considerable interest in recent 179
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[41], and accounting/auditing research [42]–[46]. In the trust181
literature, trust serves as a lubricant to the wheels upon which182
all business transactions and relationships are based [47], [48].183
Trust plays a central role in every sustainable business endeavor184
because trust can reduce agency and transaction costs, ensure185
the smooth operation of transaction, and increase innovation186
and productivity [49]. Trust decisions occur in an environment187
of uncertainty, where stakeholders face vulnerable situation188
(risk/uncertain situation) leading to a dependence or reliance189
on management for security [50], [51]. Shareholders must trust190
managers, employers must trust employees, buyers must trust191
sellers, the public must trust business, and the government must192
trust business. Unfortunately, there is a scarcity of trust following193
the prevalence of recent corporate scandals (e.g., Arthur Ander-194
son, Enron, Tyco, Adelphia, WorldCom, etc.). The impact of195
these corporate scandals on stakeholders’ trust is significant.196
Furthermore, Rodgers [5], [19], [20] argues that there are197
two primary trust algorithmic pathways of rational choice; rule-198
based trust and category-based trust, which underscore the basis199
of trust relationships. Expertise level, incomplete information,200
rapidly changing environments, and/or time pressure sturdily201
influence the implementation of these primary trust algorithmic202
pathways [20]. However, the refinement of the interaction of203
people, process and technology will influence information ex-204
change and individuals’ perceptions. As a result, this can further205
yield three secondary higher level trust algorithmic pathways of206
third-party-based trust, role-based trust and knowledge-based207
trust [19], [20], [27]. To avoid increasing threats (e.g., cyber-208
crimes resulting in fraud, errors, and risks) to business processes209
and shareholders’ trust, we analyse and explore how fraudu-210
lent schemes are affected differently by employing one, or a211
combination of the three trust positions. We also investigate212
the interrelated processes of the throughput model and trust213
algorithmic pathways that have an impact on decisions affecting214
organizations.215
Advanced Internet technology has now reached a point where216
achieving improved safety would occur through a better under-217
standing of human error mechanisms [52] and trust relationships218
[21]. Human error is a causal or contributing factor in accidents,219
particularly in the security industries. Consequently, these trust220
positions could protect information systems and electronic com-221
merce and the cyber-based technologies and the business envi-222
ronment [53]. For example, cyber-related security threats have223
presented debilitating consequences for organizations and have224
negatively impacted economic activities significantly [20], [41],225
[54]. As errors are intimately bound with the notion of intention,226
organizations are compounded with decisions regarding type 1227
versus type 2 process errors [25]. In this regard, Zapf and Reason228
[54] suggested that errors lead to “the nonattainment of corporate229
goals, therefore, the dominant trust positions introduced in this230
article works on the assumption that errors should be potentially231
avoidable.”232
Moreover, it has been recognized that there is constructive233
magnitude of trust building system embedded within daily op-234
erations of organizations [55]–[57]. In particular, the challenges235
of increasing interpersonal communication and online trans-236
action in a system or network have led many researchers to237
Fig. 3. Fraud triangle-unfolding the gateway to fraud/cyber attacks. Source:
Rodgers, Söderbom, and Guiral, 2014.
investigate the impact of online trust on cognitive processes 238
[41], [58]–[62]. The overwhelming conclusion is that cyber- 239
crime continues to cause increasing threat to people, processes, 240
and technology of businesses, impacting upon organizational 241
values and eroding stakeholders’ trust. Trust plays a critical 242
role in developing organizational relationships internally and 243
externally because of its related uncertainty, risk, fear, and in- 244
terdependence factors in the decision-making process [60]–[63] 245
(see Table II). 246
III. THROUGHPUT MODEL METHODOLOGY 247
This article utilizes the throughput model (see Fig. 1) to gain 248
further insight on how organizations can create an environment 249
that engenders trustworthy behavior. To the best our knowledge, 250
this is the first study integrating different trust positions, fraud, 251
risks and errors in decision-making algorithmic pathways that 252
might be useful in reducing fraudulent behaviors. 253
Fig. 3 illustrates the key three enablers, which can be captured 254
by implementing the fraud triangle. The fraud triangle consists 255
of perceived opportunity, perceived pressure/incentive, and ra- 256
tionalisation justification of fraud [5], [64]. The fraud triangle 257
diagnoses high-risk fraud situations. Perceived opportunity is 258
the possibility of entry into a situation where fraud can be 259
carried out, for example, where there are weaknesses in an 260
internal control system. Perceived pressure/incentive addresses 261
the motivation or underlying drive for individuals to commit 262
fraud. Rationalisation represents the propensity for individuals 263
to “bend” their ethical positions, moral standards, among others, 264
to justify their fraudulent activities [5]. 265
This model captures four major concepts (perception, infor- 266
mation, judgment, and decision choice) which help explain, 267
describe, and/or predict situations or environmental conditions 268
in an ethical, trust, or general decision-making task [20], [65]. 269
To clarify different algorithmic trust pathways, the Throughput 270
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TABLE II
PEOPLE, PROCESSES AND TECHNOLOGY RELATED TO TYPES 1 AND 2 ERRORS
stages: perception as problem framing (P); information ex-272
change (I); judgment representing the analysis of perception273
and information (J); and decision choice (D). Perception and274
information depend on each other in the throughput model275
because information can influence how a decision maker frames276
a problem (perception) or selects evidence (information) to be277
used in the decision-making process.278
In Fig. 1, perception (P) can be influenced by an individual’s279
educational background, religion, belief, communal values, up-280
bringing, etc. Perception depicts the framing of an organiza-281
tional environment, which involves risk assessment, perceiving282
fraudulent transactions, such as cyber fraud, high risk trans-283
actions, cyberattack, etc. Previous studies posit that a change284
in framing (i.e., risk perception) influences risk preferences,285
and risk attitude. Thus changes in risk perception may lead286
to a pronounced shift from risk aversion to risk taking [23],287
[66], brought into question rational-choice theories of human288
decision making due to violation to the description-invariance289
principle (i.e., fixed preferences across different descriptions of290
identical choice problems), one of the least questionable tenets291
of rational-choice theories.292
Information (I) includes customer databases, organizations’293
databases, forensic evidence, social networks, financial infor-294
mation, governmental agencies’ reports on fraud, etc. In the295
judgment (J) stage, financial and nonfinancial information are296
scrutinised and weight is placed on key information which is297
compared to other alternatives. We argue that experts, such as298
auditors, forensic accountants, cybercrime investigators, etc.,299
usually retrieve from their knowledge base and expertise to300
examine situations to collect evidence. Finally, in the decision301
choice (D) stage, we argue that experts make trustworthy de-302
cisions based on combinations of perception, information, and303
judgment.304
In addition, the throughput model in Fig. 1 reflects in-305
terdependency between perception (P) and information (I).306
That is this relationship (P←→I) reflects a neural network307
that simulates human thought and make deep learning tech-308
niques possible for machine learning by drilling down on309
informational (I) databases [67]. Deep learning (also known 310
as deep structured learning or hierarchical learning) is part 311
of a wider family of machine learning methods based on 312
learning data representations, as opposed to task-specific 313
algorithms [68]. 314
Rodgers [19], [20] argued that trust positions in the throughput 315
model play a role as a cognitive process, which is rationally 316
based on one’s interest (incentive), for normative reasons, or for 317
reasons of character or psychological disposition. Therefore, the 318
underlying trust depends on the assessment of the trustworthi- 319
ness of another in a particular situation [69]. Most importantly, 320
the throughput model enables decision makers to understand 321
why individuals have selected information which supports their 322
trust positions and have ignored other information that does 323
not support their positions. The following section discuss the 324
six algorithmic trust pathways based on the throughput model. 325
These algorithmic trust pathways represent are as follows. 326
1) Trust as a rational choice: A presumed understanding of 327
the other party’s desires and intentions. 328
2) Rule-based trust: Trusting someone due to a strictly en- 329
forceable normative rule or legal system. 330
3) Category-based trust: Social networks sharing some com- 331
mon experience, tradition, education, custom, culture, re- 332
ligion, and so forth. 333
4) Third-party-based trust: People use themselves or the 334
people around them as their basis for defining trust. 335
5) Role-based trust: Tied to formal societal structures, de- 336
pending on individual attributes. 337
6) Knowledge-based trust: People have enough relevant and 338
reliable information about others to understand them and 339
accurately predict their likely behavior. 340
The following section discuss each algorithmic pathway and 341
its proposition. 342
1) P→D (rational-based trust): According to Rodgers et al. 343
[19], [20], [70], the P→D algorithmic pathway represents 344
trust as a rational choice, which is the quickest way to 345
make a decision. Here, the trust decision takes perceptual 346
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choice because individuals are usually motivated to act348
in their perceived self-interest. In the rational-based trust,349
individuals prioritise the maximisation of their expected350
gains and the minimisation of their expected losses. This351
trust algorithmic pathway primarily manifests in a situ-352
ation of low risk/high certainty. For example, where the353
momentary amount involved in a transaction is negligible,354
individuals may adopt a rational-based trust position. In355
addition, time pressure, difficulties in interpreting infor-356
mation and rapidly shifting environmental conditions are357
amongst the factors which can influence people to select358
this particular trust algorithmic pathway. In addition, the359
level of knowledge or expertise of individuals can in-360
fluence people to select a rational-based trust position.361
Research suggests that time pressures may alter both362
the cognitive and emotional processes involved in risky363
decision making [71]–[73]. For example, time pressures364
may have a damaging effect on cognitive processes, such365
as impairing working memory capacity (e.g., [74], [75])366
and plummeting decision accuracy (e.g., [75]). In addition,367
subsidiary anticipatory stress has a negative influence on368
learning and information processing abilities [73]. Hence,369
in a high-risk situation, certain individuals with a requisite370
level of expertise will ignore incomplete information and371
judgment and make a quick decision choice. For example,372
internet users may have many barriers to international373
cyber transactions resulting from disparate regulations in374
various foreign countries and an overall deficiency of fa-375
miliarity and lack of information with webpage platforms.376
Proposition 1a: In a time-pressured environment of incom-377
plete information, high levels of expertise between the parties378
(online or offline) will result in a highly trustworthy relationship.379
Proposition 1b: In a time-pressured environment of incom-380
plete information, low levels of expertise between the parties381
(online or offline) will result in a poor trustworthy relationship.382
2) P→J→D (rule-based trust): This trust position empha-383
sises the “power base,” i.e., the use of rules, laws regu-384
lations etc., to influence the trust position of individuals385
[20]. The rule-based trust can be categorized under ex-386
plicit and implicit contracts. Under the explicit contract,387
the individual trust position is influenced by factors in-388
cluding his/her contract of employment, job description,389
and organizational policies and procedures. The implicit390
contract includes the individual’s own personal values391
and the organizational culture, values, norms, etc. In a392
risky/uncertain environment, organizations use structures,393
and power to influence the individual trust position. The394
structural and interpersonal components of rules are likely395
to influence perceived trust [76]. With the rule-based trust,396
direct information is ignored due to either its unreliability397
or incompleteness. Currall and Epstein [77] argued that,398
“because rule-based trust involves personal consequences;399
trust position under the rule-based trust is individual ori-400
ented.” Also, individuals may adopt the rule-based trust401
position as a result of certain influences, such as some402
sets of spiritual doctrine, codes of trust for profession-403
als (accountants and auditors), codes of conduct specific404
to certain organizations, and social values, etc. Rules, 405
practices, and mechanisms are unlikely to change sud- 406
denly. Rather, they are mentally represented as assimilated 407
knowledge that can influence the individual trust decision. 408
In a strong rule-based situation, results that depend entirely 409
on trust are expected to decline in the long term. On the 410
contrary, when an organization’s approach calls for fewer 411
rules, employees are allowed to bring their innovations and 412
initiative to bear in the production process. This will result 413
in high productivity and less transaction cost [78]–[81]. 414
When situations are less than rule-based, a higher level 415
of trust will have the opportunity to result in certain 416
situations where information on the internet is neither 417
weak nor strong in directing a user toward an outcome. 418
Trust helps to “tip the scales” as trust helps a person 419
to interpret previous behavior and/or assess the future 420
behavior of another party. For example, it is impractical 421
to have written rules that deal with trust issues when com- 422
municating on a webpage based on feelings, values, and 423
beliefs. 424
Proposition 2a: Trustworthy relationships that are based on 425
high level transparent, responsible, accountable, and enforceable 426
rules and regulations will lead to low level false rejection and/or 427
false acceptance into the network system. 428
Proposition 2b: Trustworthy relationships that are based on 429
low level transparent, responsible, accountable and enforceable 430
rules and regulations will lead to high level false rejection and/or 431
false acceptance into the network system. 432
3) I→J→D (category-based trust): Category-based trust 433
refers to direct information that has an impact on judg- 434
ment, which in turn influences decision choice. The 435
category-based trust emphasises the fact that individuals 436
are subject to preformatted information regarding rela- 437
tionship types [20]. The category-based trust operates on 438
the philosophy that people and relationship types can be 439
grouped into segments with similar characteristics. For 440
example, organizations can categorize their suppliers or 441
customers into different segments. In this situation, the 442
level of trust is high because organizations have adequate 443
and reliable information about each segment. On the other 444
hand, the level of trust will be low if organizations have 445
incomplete or unreliable information about the segment. 446
Category-based trust highlights the relationships that exist 447
amongst individuals within social networks [82]–[84]. 448
Individuals within a particular social group usually share 449
similar values, cultures, norms, belief systems, etc. [84]. 450
The strength of a category-based relationship is linked to 451
its frequency, reciprocity, emotional intensity and trusting 452
relationships to build slowly and incrementally over time, 453
especially when it involves inclusion in a category. For ex- 454
ample, relative knowledge regarding a particular website 455
as well as other friends and family members use of the 456
website can be reflected in completing future monetary 457
transactions on the same website. 458
Proposition 3a: Complete and reliable information about the 459
organization’ customer/supplier segments will lead to stronger 460
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Proposition 3b: Incomplete and unreliable information462
about the organization’ customer/supplier segments will lead463
to weaker online trust relationships.464
These three primary algorithmic pathways either emphasise465
problem framing (P) or information (I), but not both [20]. Fur-466
thermore, the three primary algorithmic pathways encapsulate467
an understanding of trust and distrust within people relationships468
[85]–[87]. We can associate trust (high, low), no trust, and469
distrust (low, high) in the algorithmic pathways with values that470
vary from +1 (the highest trust) to -1 (the highest distrust).471
Each path can have a positive (+), negative (-) or zero (0) sign472
to represent the magnitude of trust, distrust and no trust.473
Rodgers et al. [20], [70], [88] argued that trust algorithmic474
pathways can be interrelated by perception and information475
via three secondary higher-level trust algorithmic pathways;476
rational-based trust (P→D), rule-based trust (P→J→D), or477
category-based trust (I→J→D). First, information source (I)478
conciliates and changes trust as a rational choice into third-479
party-based trust (I→P→D). Next, problem framing (P) re-480
constructs category-based trust (I→J→D) into role-based trust481
(P→I→J→D). Finally, information (I) transforms rule-based482
trust (P→J→D) into knowledge-based trust (I→P→J→D). The483
remaining three secondary higher level trust algorithmic path-484
ways supplement the primary algorithmic pathways by adding485
either problem framing (P) or gathering information (I), and this486
is discussed as follows.487
4) I→P→D (third-party-based trust): This trust algorithmic488
pathway relies on the third party as a channel of trust [20].489
In this instance, decision makers use people around them490
as a basis for defining their trust pathways to serve as491
reinforcement to their existing perception. As a result, one492
is more certain of his or her trust (distrust) in another. The493
third-party based trust therefore depends on the indirect494
connection between one entity and a third party and the495
indirect connection between two entities. For example,496
third parties as conduits of trust assume that an internet497
user desiring to purchase shoes on the internet relies on498
using people around them who promote buying shoes on499
a particular website. Third-party information serves to500
reinforce existing webpage use, making one’s perception501
more certain of his or her trust (or distrust) in a particular502
webpage.503
Proposition 4a: Relevant and reliable third-party informa-504
tion can result in a high trust relationship between two parties505
involved in a network transaction.506
Proposition 4b: Nonrelevant and unreliable third-party infor-507
mation can result in a low trust relationship between two parties508
involved in a network transaction.509
5) P→I→J→D (role-based trust): The basis of trust in this510
algorithmic pathway depends on the role (profession, ex-511
pertise, position, attribute, authority etc.) of the party to be512
trusted [20]. In this algorithmic pathway, people trust that513
specific role types can deliver specific desire outcomes. An514
example of role-based trust is gaining certification from515
an engineer, accountant, medical doctor, etc. For example,516
shareholders trust in the role of auditors because they517
believe that auditors have skills and professional exper-518
tise to audit the accounts of organizations. In addition,519
audit/accounting experts ensure that all of their members 520
adhere to strict professional conduct. Furthermore, em- 521
ployees are prepared to accept a manager’s decision due 522
to the manager’s organizational role and authority. Individ- 523
uals’ trust in their organizational authority (management) 524
shapes their willingness to follow the rules and regulations 525
of the organization [89]. In addition, reliable information 526
about personal qualities, social limitations of others, and 527
existence of trustworthy communication architecture are 528
crucial for making trustworthy decisions [90]–[92]. In 529
other words, trust “is cultivated out of productive inquiry 530
rather than imperceptive acknowledgment” [93]. 531
Examples of role-based trust are certification of a web- 532
based plumber or medical doctor. That is, we trust a 533
medical doctor since we trust the practice of medicine 534
and believe that medical doctors are trained to apply valid 535
principles of medicine. In addition, we have evidence 536
every day that these principles are valid when we observe 537
certain remedies recommended to save lives. 538
Proposition 5a: The level of expertise is high of the auditor, 539
forensic accountant or cybercrime investigator can determine 540
an individual’s trustworthiness is high in order to minimise both 541
false rejections and false acceptance into the network. 542
Proposition 5b: The level of expertise is low of the auditor, 543
forensic accountant or cybercrime investigator can determine 544
an individual’s trustworthiness is low in order to minimise both 545
false rejections and false acceptance into the network. 546
6) I→P→J→D (knowledge-based trust): This algorithmic 547
pathway expands on the rule-based trust in that past and/or 548
present information (knowledge-based), can influence in- 549
dividuals’ perceptions, which in turn affects their judg- 550
ment and decision choices [20]. The knowledge-based 551
trust algorithmic pathway is influenced by fewer time 552
pressures and a reasonable level of expertise in an un- 553
structured environment in order to form judgment about 554
the probability of trustworthy behavior of others [20]. 555
In this trust algorithmic pathway, trust is considered as 556
a function of “general expectations” that is premised on 557
past and present information. Knowledge-based trust tran- 558
spires when individuals or organizations have enough, 559
relevant, and reliable information about webpage-based 560
companies in order to understand them and accurately 561
predict their likely behavior. For example, organization’ 562
web pages on the internet vary by size and industry and the 563
environment they carry out their operations is determined 564
by legal traditions. Consequently, knowledge-based trust 565
pathways permit flexibility in the design of mandatory and 566
nonmandatory measures in a global cyber context. 567
Proposition 6a: Reliable and relevant information will en- 568
courage higher [94] levels of trustworthiness over and above 569
rules and laws. The type and level of trust pathways employed 570
by organizations may influence its productivity, competition, 571
and value. 572
Proposition 6b: Unreliable and irrelevant information will 573
encourage higher [94] levels of trustworthiness over and above 574
rules and laws. The type and level of trust pathways employed by 575
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IV. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS578
Artificial Intelligence techniques, such as trust decision-579
making algorithms assist our understanding of employing ma-580
chine learning and deep learning for solving fraud type problems581
in the future. This conceptual research article had argued that582
the first step in the scientific process was not observation, but583
the generation of propositions (or hypotheses), which may then584
be tested critically by observations and experiments. Type 1585
and type 2 errors can occur because of people, processes, and586
technology bias (observer, instrument, recall, etc.). Therefore,587
this theoretical research article had identified appropriate trust588
positions to implement in order to address type 1 and type 2589
errors. Type 1 error can contribute to inefficiencies and higher590
transaction costs, that can spell reduced productivity, as depicted591
by a cyber system. Furthermore, admittance of type 2 error592
creates fraud triangle characteristics consisting of perceived593
opportunity, perceived pressure/incentive, and rationalisation594
justification of fraud. These characteristics are systematic of a595
problematic cyber system.596
Our implications of using a particular trust position depend597
on the controlling factors influencing type 1 and type 2 errors598
in relationship with people, processes and technology. Further-599
more, the six dominant trust positions or algorithmic pathways600
were tied to situations that could lead to type 1 or type 2 errors.601
These trust positions denote: rational-based trust; rule-based602
trust; category-based trust; third-party-based trust; role-based603
trust; and knowledge-based trust.604
Trust behavior was a prerequisite for knowledge production605
and its exchanges. Individuals were not machines. They think606
and have feelings. When they pursue activities or communicate607
ideas, they were trusting in others. In addition, trust as a rela-608
tional and institutional asset supports competitive advantages.609
Therefore, trust can be viewed as an intangible asset that adds610
value to an organization.611
A vast variety of Internet devices, including institutions,612
norms, cyber ware, etc., enables individuals/organizations to613
cooperate in an efficient and effective manner. The throughput614
model was useful in understanding what causes individuals to act615
in a manner whereby they do not exploit cyber world for positive616
results. Trust augmented in a positive manner was “good” for617
internet traffic, according to the ethical principles of normative618
philosophy, not according to the moral standards of a given group619
or culture. Beliefs about what is right, just and fair were possible620
influences on information network systems. The management621
of knowledge and technology in organizations is critical to622
competitive advantage and organizational success. This article623
highlights how decision-makers’ perceptual framing, along with624
information can greatly influence decision choices. The through-625
put modeling perspective discussed in this article reinforces the626
fact that different algorithmic pathways were dependent upon627
risk factors embedded in trust positions representing cognitive,628
behavioral, individual, and social inputs, that modifies their629
decision choices.630
Future research can investigate whether a particular631
trust position for cyber platforms supported by a particular632
decision-making pathway is more appropriate given a particular633
situation involving trust. In addition, future research can explore 634
which decision-making pathway can typify better relationships 635
between organizations and individuals when communicating 636
across the Internet. Finally, the throughput model different 637
algorithmic pathways can allow us to better understand how 638
trust is nurtured and eroded as different parties interact. 639
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